share would be .7651, or $25,931,261.47. But her creditors were content to accept $3,333,212.26 less than that amount. Subtracting the last sum from the total debt leaves $30,563,861.56 as the sum to be apportioned. Taking .235 as representing the proportion of West Virginia, we have $7,182,507.46, as her share of the principal debt. For examples of apportionment of debts according to the value of the property set off to each part in cases of a division of municipal corporation, see 1 SMITH, MOD. LAW OF MUN. CORP., § 467; *Canova* v. *State,* 18 Fla. 512; *Brewis* v. *Duluth,* 3 McCrary, 219; *Ackley* v. *Vilas,* 79 Wis. 157, 48 N. W. 257; *Board* v. *Board,* 62 Miss. 325. The figures given by the Court were merely provisional, however, to be finally arranged, along with other questions, such as interest, by a conference between the parties, the Court expressing a hope that the matter would be speedily settled outside of court, since this was no ordinary commercial suit, but rather a quasi international controversy, referred to the Supreme Court in reliance upon the honor and Constitutional obligations of the States concerned, rather than in reliance upon ordinary remedies.

TORTS—PERSONAL RIGHTS—RIGHT OF PRIVACY.—Plaintiff, an infant five years old, by next friend, brought an action for damages against defendants, jewelry merchants, for publishing his picture without his consent for the purpose of advertising their business. *Held,* that one has the exclusive right to his picture as a property right of material profit, and may sue at law for damages for the invasion of the right. *Munden* v. *Harris et al.* (1911), — Mo. App. —, 134 S. W. 1076.

That there is a right of privacy of which the law will take notice, and that the privilege and capacity to exercise that right is a thing of value—is property—is the view taken by the Missouri court, and it finds ample support in the following cases: *Edison* v. *Edison Mfg. Co.,* 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392; *Pavesich* v. *New Eng. Life Ins. Co.,* 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 69 L. R. A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104; *Foster-Milburn Co.* v. *Chinn,* 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364. The existence of a "right of privacy" has been denied, however, in *Roberson* v. *Rochester Folding Box Co.,* 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442, 59 L. R. A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828; *Henry* v. *Cherry & Webb,* 30 R. I. 13, 73 Atl. 97, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, and *Atkinson* v. *Doherty & Co.,* 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285, 46 L. R. A. 219, 80 Am. St. Rep. 507. The argument that there is such a right was first advanced in 1890 in an article in 4 HARV. L. REV. 193. Cases involving the question have been passed upon by the courts of several states, and, as indicated above, "authority" is still pretty evenly divided. The Missouri court in the principal case does not rest its decision wholly upon the right of privacy or of "inviolate personality," but upon the further ground that the exclusive right to one's picture is a property right of value. In this it is supported by the holding of the court in *Edison* v. *Edison Mfg. Co.,* supra, but that any property right is involved in such a case is denied by the Michigan Supreme Court in *Atkinson* v. *Doherty & Co.,* supra. The questions raised in the principal case are discussed at length, and the decisions reviewed, in 3 MICH. L. REV. 559, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 991, and 2 AM. & ENG. ANN. CASES, 561.